Summary of Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 by Chittum III, Thomas L.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
1-26-2012
Summary of Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. Adv. Op.
No. 3
Thomas L. Chittum III
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chittum III, Thomas L., "Summary of Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3" (2012). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 197.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/197
Vaile v. Porsboll, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 (Jan. 26, 2012)1 
FAMILY LAW – CHILD SUPPORT 
Summary 
 The Court addressed an appeal2 from a district court post-divorce decree order setting 
fixed monthly child support payments and assessing arrearage and penalties. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court found the district court order to be an impermissible modification and 
remanded for further proceedings, consistent with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(“UIFSA”).  Under UIFSA, a Nevada court retains subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a 
Nevada child support order even when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada, provided 
no other state has assumed jurisdiction.  However, without consent, the court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to modify such an order when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada.  A 
court may clarify an order, but if it changes the parties’ rights, it is a modification. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 In 1998, a Nevada district court granted Robert Scotlund Vaile (“Vaile”) and Cisilie A. 
Porsboll (“Porsboll”) a divorce.  The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ agreement on child 
support payments.  Under the agreement, Vaile was required to pay Porsboll monthly child 
support payments of an amount to be calculated using the parties’ annual exchange of income 
statements or tax return information.  The parties never exchanged such financial data or used the 
method for calculating payments.  Nonetheless, Vaile paid Porsboll $1,300 a month in child 
support from August 1998 to April 2000, when he stopped voluntarily making payments. 
 
 In November 2007, Porsboll filed a motion in Nevada district court asking it to establish 
a “sum certain”3 amount of child support due from Vaile each month, to calculate Vaile’s child 
support arrears, and to issue a judgment for those arrearages.  At the time of the filing, neither 
the parties nor their children resided in Nevada. 
 
The district court granted Porsboll’s motion and set Vaile’s monthly child support 
payment at $1,300, the amount he previously paid voluntarily.  Using that amount, the district 
court calculated Vaile’s arrears and assessed him penalties.  It then ordered a judgment against 
him.  Vaile appealed and, inter alia, challenged the court’s child support and penalty 
determinations, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the 
child support agreement in the divorce decree. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  By Thomas L. Chittum, III.  
2  The Court considered the consolidated appeals of both parties but resolved the matter without reaching Porsboll’s 
challenge to the district court’s methodology for calculating penalties. 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.070(1)(B) (2007). 
Discussion 
 Justice Hardesty wrote for the Court, which reversed the district court’s order setting 
Vaile’s support payment at $1,300, reversed the calculation of arrearages and penalties, and 
remanded for further proceedings.  Justices Saitta and Parraguirre concurred. 
 
 The UIFSA, which has been enacted in all 50 states, creates a “single-order system” for 
child support orders, so that only one state’s order is effective at any given time.4  Because no 
other state had entered a child support order superseding the one incorporated into Vaile and 
Porsboll’s divorce decree, the Nevada order was still the “controlling order.”5 
 
Under UIFSA, an issuing court retains “continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify” 
its order if, at the time of request for modification, its order is controlling and the parties reside in 
the issuing state.6  However, the issuing state lacks authority to modify a support order when the 
parties and children do not reside there, even if the order is controlling and has not been modified 
by another state.7  Here, neither the parties nor children resided in Nevada at the time Porsboll 
filed her motion.  Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order.8  
 
Nonetheless, the issuing court still had jurisdiction to enforce its order and could clarify 
its order for purpose of enforcement.9  The Court therefore had to determine whether the district 
court order setting Vaile’s obligation at $1,300 a month was a clarification or modification. 
 
The Court had not previously examined the distinction between modification and 
clarification of a district court order in family law context, so it turned to other courts that had.  
Those courts looked to whether the contested order changed the parties’ substantive rights under 
a previous order or merely defined those rights.10  The Court concluded that a modification 
occurs when an order alters the parties’ substantive rights, but a clarification involves the court 
defining the rights that have already been awarded. 
 
Since the monthly support payment awarded in the divorce decree was to be recalculated 
annually using tax return information or income statements, it was possible the amount would 
change from year to year.  By setting Vaile’s payment at the fixed amount of $1,300 a month, the 
district court “substantively altered the parties’ rights” and therefore impermissibly modified, 
rather than clarified, the child support order. 
 
 
                                                 
4  Nevada’s version of UIFSA was codified at NEV. REV. STAT. CH. 130. 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.207 (2007). 
6  Id. at § 130.205(1)(A) (2007). 
7  Id.   
8  The Court noted that parties may consent to a court’s jurisdiction to modify a child support order.  See NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 130.205(1)(B).  Here, however, there was no evidence of either party’s consent. 
9  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 130.206 (2007); Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 510-11 (R.I. 2011); Nordstrom v. 
Nordstrom, 649 S.E. 2d 200, 204 (Va. Ct. App. 2007). 
10  See Collins v. Billow, 592 S.E.2d 843, 844-45 (Ga. 2004); Boucher v. Boucher, 191 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1971); Ulrich v. Ulrich, 400 N.W. 2d 213, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Stoelting v. Stoelting, 412 N.W.2d 861, 
862-63 (N.D. 1987); In Re Marriage of Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
Conclusion 
 Under UIFSA, a Nevada court may enforce or clarify a Nevada child support order even 
when the parties and children do not reside in Nevada, if no other state has assumed jurisdiction.  
However, a Nevada court may not modify a child support order when neither the parties nor 
children reside in Nevada, unless the parties consent.  It is clarification when the court defines 
the parties’previously awarded substantive rights, but modification when it alters those rights. 
 
